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INTRODUCTION 
  
In the aftermath of the shock result of the Nice Treaty referendum in Ireland in June 20011 it 
was commonly stated that the result did not represent the electorate’s rejection of European 
Union (EU) enlargement. In fact both supporters and opponents of the Nice Treaty agreed 
wholeheartedly on this point. The Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) and his Foreign Minister 
assured their counterparts in the EU and the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) that purely domestic factors explained the result –enlargement had not been an issue. 
Opponents of the Treaty, similarly, couched every public statement with an insistence that 
they were in favour of enlargement. These claims were treated with some scepticism in the 
CEE candidate states. Not only would the result complicate the ongoing enlargement 
negotiations; it might postpone accession indefinitely.  
This article has one central objective: it seeks to analyse the extent to which the issue of EU 
enlargement really mattered in the 2001 and 2002 Nice Treaty referendum campaigns and, 
more generally, in the evolving European debate in Ireland. The analysis proceeds through an 
examination of four crucial issue areas that figured prominently in the Nice Treaty campaign 
of 2001 and have remained to the fore in discussion at the National Forum on Europe 
throughout 2002.2 On each of these issues there exist profound disagreements between 
Ireland’s pro-Europeans and an emerging Euro-sceptic lobby. Analysis of each individual 
issue is set out against the contextual arguments deployed regarding enlargement. Further, it is 
contended the range of concerns expressed in Ireland about enlargement, whether with respect 
to institutional reform or policy issues, also exist in many other EU states. Indeed, fear and 
unease about the implications of enlargement permeate political dicsourse across the EU. This 
article begins by analysing the reaction to the shock 2001 referendum result across Europe. 
  
REACTIONS 
  
There was a strong linkage between the enlargement issue and the No vote in the analysis 
offered by candidate state governments in their reactions. For example, a Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry spokesman, Gabor Horvath, said, “We are convinced that the Irish politicians will do 
their best to explain and demonstrate to the Irish voters before the next enlargement the 
benefits coming from enlargement.”3 The Polish foreign affairs spokesman added that he was 
confident “The EU, driven by feelings of responsibility and solidarity, will find a solution that 
will allow the Nice Treaty to come into force and create the structural framework for 
enlargement.” Milos Zeman, the Czech Premier, did not mince his words.              He argued: 
“You cannot divide the individual parts of the referendum and that is why I am very, very sad 
indeed that my friends from Ireland, in fact, oppose enlargement.”4 Indeed, concern was so 
great among CEE states that the Taoiseach agreed to face the Polish media to explain what 
had happened after a direct request from his Polish counterpart at the Gothenburg Summit one 
week after the referendum was held. The evidence thus suggests that whatever the 
protestations to the contrary in Ireland, there was established a very clear and direct 
association in the CEE candidate states between the No vote in Ireland and a negative view to 
their accession to the EU. 
  
The impression that enlargement was central to the No vote in Ireland took hold quickly in 
European capitals. Will Hutton made an explicit link between the No vote and enlargement: 
“Italy’s Berlusconi is openly sceptical about the costs of enlargement; the Irish voted against 
it in their referendum for the same reason.”5 George Soros, in an address in Budapest, 
suggested that one of the reasons Ireland rejected the Nice Treaty was “over fears aid to EU 
states would dwindle after eastern candidates joined.”6 Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan in 
London argued, “Asked to endorse a Treaty that would turn them into net contributors, Irish 
voters were unimpressed.”7 Another editorial asserted that “there is no reciprocal sense that 
Irish GDP having ballooned, a similar effort should now be made on behalf of Eastern 
Europe. Geo-politics and geo-gratitude do not go together, it seems.”8  
  
In the aftermath of the referendum result, almost every public statement from the Yes and No 
sides, from Cabinet ministers, interest groups, business organisations, and trade unions 
stressed that Ireland was not opposed to the enlargement of the EU. Indeed much political 
capital was spent on assuring all and sundry of Irish goodwill. Within weeks of the 
referendum, the Minister for Foreign Affairs was announcing new resident embassies in four 
EU candidate countries, “in a move designed to underline Ireland’s support for EU 
enlargement despite the rejection of the Nice Treaty.”9 Embassies are expected to be open in 
all of the candidate states by the end of 2003. 
  
Senior government Minister Dermot Ahern acknowledged just how contentious was the issue 
of enlargement in Ireland. He insisted, “we need to convince people that enlargement is 
correct and that is one of the reasons why we have so many people coming here [to the 
Forum]…”10 The centrality accorded enlargement within the Forum’s discussions is thus 
acknowledged. Surely, if the No vote had not been about enlargement it would not have 
figured so prominently in the agenda and discourse of that body?  
  
On the No side, campaigners from Sinn Fein, the Green Party, the National Platform and the 
Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) all argued that their problems lay not with 
enlargement but with the Nice Treaty and the direction of the European integration process 
more generally. Yet, analysis of their policy documents, public pronouncements and 
contributions to the Forum, yields a decided preoccupation with the issue of enlargement. Far 
from being accommodating of enlargement, most on the No side in fact seem to be decidedly 
uneasy about it, even if their rhetoric is couched in the language of solidarity and cooperation. 
  
FOUR KEY ISSUES IN THE DEBATE 
  
Having established that enlargement is of major significance in Ireland’s European 
conversation, the task is to determine the extent to which and exactly how enlargement 
influenced policy positions on the key EU issues before the electorate in Ireland in the run up 
to and after the 2001 referendum. The issues to be addressed here include economic 
competitiveness, the future of European agriculture and regional funding instruments, large-
small state relations in an enlarging Union and immigration. 
  
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
  
It is clear that enlarging the EU eastwards represents a significant economic challenge for the 
current member states. On the one hand, they face the challenge of economic competition 
from the candidate states whilst simultaneously attempting to reconfigure the Union’s 
financial framework in a way that will benefit the candidate states whilst not unduly affecting 
current member states. This is especially important as “net contributors to the EU budget 
refuse to bear the brunt of enlargement expenses and net beneficiaries, on the other hand, 
argue that relatively poorer areas should not be disproportionately affected by 
enlargement.”11 
  
In the Irish context, these issues are particularly problematic. This is because the phenomenal 
Irish economic performance of the last decade has served to radically change the context in 
which economic policy is discussed. With Ireland now attaining a GDP per capita figure of 
circa ğ30,000 (second highest among the EU states), the dynamics of the economic 
relationship with the EU and the wider world have clearly changed.12 Like other EU states, 
the Irish view of enlargement will be determined to a large extent by expectations of changes 
in net welfare. In the Irish situation, however, this is even more the case because the benefits 
of EU membership have largely been seen to pivot around the issue of financial transfers from 
Brussels. The prospect of Ireland becoming a net contributor to the EU budget after 2006 and 
being replaced in the ‘subvention queue’ by the candidate states is one that has generated 
fierce debate. Such concerns are also of course visible in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, the EU 
states that have along with Ireland benefited most from EU structural and cohesion funding. 
The difference is that in Ireland the debate on the Nice Treaty has brought these issues firmly 
into the public domain. 
  
Despite this, there has been an extraordinary consensus between government, business and 
even the trade unions in Ireland that the eastern enlargement of the Union represents a 
significant opportunity for the Republic to capture part of the emerging market in Eastern 
Europe. Enlargement is seen as low risk from this economic perspective. The key advocates 
of enlargement, not surprisingly, come from the business community. Foremost amongst them 
are the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC); the Construction Industry 
Federation; the Chambers of Commerce and various state agencies charged with economic 
development mandates such as the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) and Forfás.13 
Also of note have been the contributions of individual companies with business interests in 
CEE and in the EU, some of whom were much more prominent in the 2002 referendum 
campaign, feeling threatened by the prospect of a second No vote on Nice. Similarly, 
government ministers and MEPs have continually sought to stress the future economic 
benefits that will accrue to Ireland as a result of enlargement. These pronouncements took on 
a new urgency after the 2001 referendum result.  
  
The positive benefits of enlargement for Ireland are summed up by IBEC’s Maria Cronin: 
  
“Our trade with countries that are candidates for EU membership has also grown 
exponentially from 1993, to current levels of more than ğ2 billion. In the context of EU 
enlargement, our trade with these countries has tremendous potential for growth. With 
economic growth rates exceeding that of the existing EU 15, any fears the EU may have of 
burdening itself with economic liabilities are not well founded.”14 
  
For Irish business and employers, enlargement is thus of vital strategic importance. Negating 
the possibility of future threats related to enlargement, the IBEC asserts: “Some concerns 
have been expressed about Ireland’s potential to lose FDI [foreign direct investment] 
opportunities to the candidate countries. While some dynamic effects of integration can be 
expected, we believe that these will be more than out-weighed by the positive impacts of 
enlargement.”15 This picture of a relatively benign and perhaps very positive economic 
outcome to the enlargement process has been challenged only by a very limited number of 
academics.  
  
One hugely significant issue for Ireland within the EU is tax policy. Indeed, Irish negotiators 
fought hard and successfully at Nice against the harmonisation of taxes at EU level. Ireland’s 
low level of corporation tax in particular has bestowed considerable advantages on it within 
the EU market and has been challenged by Germany, Belgium and other EU states that have 
much higher rates of corporation tax. Within Ireland, the low level of corporation tax is 
associated directly with success in attracting especially American FDI and thus the overall 
success of the economy. EU challenges to this regime are greeted with suspicion and fear. 
Again, this is the context in which enlargement implications are considered. Economist Frank 
Barry noted that the Irish rate of corporation tax is about one third of the EU average.  
  
“So last year Estonia abolished its rate of corporation tax. It has a zero rate of corporation tax, 
the maximum rate in Hungary is 18 per cent and various other countries like Slovenia and 
Latvia have rates that are substantially below the EU average, so they are following our 
success story. They are learning the lessons that our success story has to teach and they are 
following us down that road.”16 
  
Implicit here is the warning of being superseded by some at least of the candidate countries in 
the years ahead. Once the rate of corporation tax is reduced to a competitive level, these 
countries become a threat to Irish FDI flows. Another argument relates to cost 
competitiveness. Barry also argued “anybody who has been to CEE will know the 
spectacularly cheap prices and low wages that prevail there… Irish manufacturing costs per 
hour come in at 106 Swedish Krone per hour compared to the Czech Republic, which comes 
in at 27. So, there is a major difference in cost competitiveness.” And, although, as Barry 
points out, CEE productivity is (currently) low, Irish productivity is in great part a 
consequence of success at attracting multinationals: “so if the Czech Republic turns out to be 
very successful in attracting this FDI away from Ireland, their productivity statistics will look 
terrific a few years down the road compared to how they look now.”17. Thus the prospect of 
enlargement, which would herald full participation by the candidate countries in the EU single 
market, conjures up fear and insecurity in Ireland. 
  
Economic arguments against enlargement, or at least those voicing scepticism on the grounds 
of perceived threats to the Irish economy, were present in both the 2001 and 2002 referendum 
campaigns and at the Forum on Europe. Anthony Coughlan, a leading Euro-sceptic and 
Secretary of the National Platform, introduced ideas about the ‘costs’ of enlargement. He 
mentioned “two million Polish farmers” and “business moving eastward, where wages are one 
third of ours, and eastward workers moving westward.”18 In a later letter to the same 
newspaper, Coughlan suggests enlargement might drive down the wages of Irish workers. 
And finally, Coughlan asks whether the government is making “contingency plans to meet the 
increased demand for housing, health and social welfare that will surely arise once word gets 
around Eastern Europe…”19 The implication here is obvious: enlargement represents an 
intolerable economic cost on incumbent EU countries. We stand to lose considerably from it. 
In similar vein, Coughlan’s ally within the Euro-sceptic lobby, Justin Barrett, suggested that if 
the treaty is passed, Ireland risks being forced to “send hundreds of millions of euro to Eastern 
Europe while schools and hospitals close here.”20 In a letter to The Irish Times in response to 
Coughlan, leading academic Tony Brown was in no doubt that the Euro-sceptics were “at last, 
revealing that opposition to enlargement is a key factor” in their opposition to the Nice 
Treaty.21 
  
These concerns about the impact of future enlargement of the EU are also now widely in 
evidence in media discourse. They are summed up succinctly by commentator Damien 
Kiberd:  
  
“Could it be that voters do not want the Nice Treaty for other, more selfish reasons? Many 
farmers, for example, will not back Nice because they know it will cost the EU more to 
modernise Polish agriculture…than it currently costs to run the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). Many trade unionists may silently wonder if it’s such a good thing to admit millions 
of Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Latvians, and Lithuanians to the EU –if they are going to exist 
as a reserve army of the unemployed willing to work for less than one euro an hour.”22 
  
AGRICULTURE AND STRUCTURAL FUNDING 
  
As one of the EU states most dependent on agriculture, Ireland obviously has quite an interest 
in any reforms of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) connected with enlargement.23 
Given the reliance of the CEE candidate states on agriculture, there will undoubtedly be 
significant changes to the CAP regime. This is likely to lead to a reduction in CAP transfers to 
Ireland and further pressure for higher contributions to the EU budget in the future to support 
the development of agriculture in CEE. Thus enlargement is the most important issue for Irish 
agricultural interests. 
  
Whilst the main farming organisation, the Irish Farmers Association (IFA), has expressed 
public support for the enlargement process and government ministers similarly see a benign 
outcome, there does seem to exist an unease among farmers across the country about the 
direction of policy. In fact, some politicians attribute the failure to carry the Nice Treaty 
referendum in 2001 to the farmers who had previously supported EU referenda in Ireland but 
seemed to stay away in large number in 2001.24 
  
Ireland’s long-serving Minister for Agriculture, Joe Walsh, argues, “enlargement will alter the 
balance within the Council of Ministers in two ways, both of significance to Ireland.” First, 
there will occur a significant shift in the balance between larger and smaller member states in 
favour of the latter. Second, of the candidate countries, eight are more dependent on 
agriculture than Ireland, some of them very heavily dependent. “The agricultural interests in 
the Council will therefore be strengthened.” Walsh also stresses that enlargement does not 
represent a threat to Irish agricultural receipts from the CAP as: 
  
“…the Berlin agreement explicitly specifies that expenditure earmarked for the existing 
member states cannot be used to meet the cost of enlargement. The resources necessary for 
CAP market supports and for rural development in the existing EU, including Ireland, in the 
period to 2006 are therefore provided for and will not be affected by enlargement.”25 
  
Notwithstanding these assurances, it is clear that a considerable degree of unease at the 
prospects of change can be evinced from the statements of many public representatives and 
spokespeople for farming organisations. Dana Rosemary Scallon MEP asks that the future of 
the CAP should be: 
  
“…further discussed before the process of enlargement begins. The CAP budget cannot be 
increased, yet, according to the European Commission, the agricultural workforce in an 
enlarged Europe will double. However, there are 2.2 million farmers in Poland alone…. What 
preparations have been made for such a vast increase? Why has there not been an extensive 
discussion on the effects and cost of enlargement so as to ensure fairness and equity for 
all?”26 
  
Another leading farming representative poses similar questions:  
  
“We recognise the importance of accession to those twelve countries. There is significant 
economic and social disadvantage in most of the applicant countries, and in the long term, the 
European Union will be much better for their joining us. For now, we do require assurances 
that the objectives for agriculture and rural areas which are agreed in Agenda 2000 will be 
followed and will not be compromised27 in the enlargement and WTO negotiations.”28 
To sum up the nature of the debate on agriculture, one has to note that the views of the main 
agricultural interest groups seem predicated on a view that the current CAP regime is 
certainly facing tremendous change but that the Berlin agreement ring fences current revenues 
for the immediate future. The prospect of enlargement, however, is one that is of deep 
concern to all groups. Similar concerns are expressed with respect to the future of the 
enlarged EU’s regional and structural funds. The fact that Ireland secured a relatively good 
deal in the 2000-2006 financial framework has meant that there has been little discussion of 
the possible impact of enlargement on the next framework. The Government acknowledges, 
however, “enlargement raises some contentious political issues,” none greater than on 
redistribution.29 Despite the ‘miracle’ of the Celtic Tiger, Ireland still received approximately 
ğ1.5 billion from the structural funds in 2001. The position will change radically after the 
negotiation of the next financial framework for 2006-11. Ireland will become a net contributor 
to the EU budget, with much of the structural aid being redirected to the newly joined CEE 
states. Accordingly, analysts expect that this issue will take on a great deal of importance 
when the new financial framework is being drawn up. And this will also be the case in Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and other EU member states. The position of Spain illustrates the point even 
more dramatically. Under the current regime, regions qualify for Objective One status if their 
GDP per capita is 75 per cent or less of the EU average. On that basis, 10 of Spain’s 17 
regions between them obtained 63 per cent of the EU structural funds budget of ğ31.5 billion 
in 2001. If that 75 per cent rule is unchanged, and if the EU’s average GDP per head is 
reduced by enlargement (as it inevitably will be with the accession of the CEE countries), 
only two of Spain’s poorest regions would then continue to qualify for aid. Thus, the 
enlargement issue takes on a crucial significance in the domestic politics of EU member 
states. 
LARGE-SMALL STATE RELATIONS IN AN ENLARGING EU 
  
A third important theme in current Irish EU discourse, and crucial to arguments about the 
Nice Treaty and future enlargement, has been that of power relations within the Union, 
particularly the relationship between large and small member states. Supporters and 
opponents of the Treaty have used enlargement to claim either a strengthening or diminution 
of small state power within the Union. 
  
In Ireland, Euro-sceptics see enlargement as the excuse needed by large countries to push 
ahead with plans to form an inner core or avant garde. Anthony Coughlan, for example, 
suggested, “Nice permits this inner group of EU states effectively to hijack the EU 
institutions…for their own purposes and to confront the others thereafter with continual 
economic and political faits accomplis [sic].”30 Ultimately, Coughlan also believes that the 
EU project is a conspiracy of the larger states against the smaller ones, a new imperialism: 
“The EU is a product of attempts by the old empires of Europe to regain their place as 
superpowers –not as individual ones, but as a single, European one. Their power élites think 
like that, that’s their tradition.”31 Sinn Fein’s similar emphasis on enlargement as a vehicle 
for neo-imperialism is demonstrated by that party’s Aengus O Snodaigh’s comments at the 
Forum: “Romano Prodi or Joschka Fischer are the ones who are forcing their vision on most 
of the small countries in Europe.”32 
  
Similarly, Roger Cole of the Euro-sceptic Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) was of the 
opinion, “…the British, the French, the Germans, the Italians and the rest of them lost their 
empires and now they are trying to create a European empire. In fact, Mr Prodi is on record as 
saying that he wants the EU to become a world power.”33 Suspicion, especially of German 
motives for arguing for changes in the institutional balance of the Union, abound. Thus we 
have a leading commentator, Kevin Meyers, railing against a future EU which “is either 
outside the central control of any state or, perhaps even worse, which could be subject to the 
control of one or two powerful states within the Union, most obviously France and Germany, 
both of which have historic pan-European missions.” Ireland is depicted here as one of the 
EU’s ‘vassal states’. Meyers goes on to “wonder whether or not the historical forces which 
once drove Germany and France are quite as extinct as the Euro-enthusiasts maintain.”34 
  
Supporters of enlargement have stressed: (a) the over-representation of small states within the 
institutional structure simply had to be addressed before the accession of a large number of 
small CEE states and the ‘micro-states’ of Cyprus and Malta –otherwise EU business would 
grind to a halt; and (b) the advantages for Ireland and other small states of the accession of 
similarly sized states from CEE. Nevertheless, the issue of large-small state relations was to 
the fore in both the 2001 and 2002 referendum campaigns and resonates strongly with public 
opinion.  
  
IMMIGRATION 
  
With the extraordinary growth in Irish living standards over the past decade, Ireland has 
become an attractive destination for migrants from Eastern Europe and Africa. Immigration, 
which hardly featured in earlier European debates, has suddenly become an issue of 
importance. And, what is striking is the way in which Euro-sceptics have sought to link 
immigration to EU enlargement in public discourse. Speculation about ‘floods of refugees’ 
and ‘armies of unemployed reserve labour’ migrating from East to West after enlargement 
have been introduced into the enlargement debate. These arguments have also surfaced in 
other EU states, notably Austria and Germany. Again, it is the prospect of enlargement that 
has helped polarise debate. 
  
Under the EU Treaties and legislation, the free movement of persons is one of the 
fundamental freedoms of the Union. This confers rights of access to residency, employment, 
and equality of treatment for nationals of the member states across the EU. Weighing up the 
evidence, Forfás concludes:  
  
“Ireland is highly unlikely to witness large migration flows from the new CEE entrants. On 
the contrary, in a situation in which Ireland is expected to need migrant labour in the medium 
to long term, some movement of labour from the accession countries to Ireland will be of 
benefit.”35 
  
Similarly, the Irish Government has sought to use studies by academic experts and the 
European Commission to underline its view that enlargement will not mean Ireland facing a 
large influx of immigrants after the first accessions take place. These assurances have been 
met with scepticism by elements of the Euro-sceptic lobby. 
  
Anthony Coughlan, on behalf of the National Platform, accused the government of behaving 
irresponsibly by agreeing to unilaterally allow citizens of the candidate states full rights of 
free movement from the first day of their accessions to the Union. In a letter to The Irish 
Times, Coughlan suggested the real possibility of large-scale immigration into Ireland by 
nationals of Central and East European countries: 
  
“While East European emigrants would naturally prefer to work in their neighbouring EU 
countries, when they find that their doors are shut for up to seven years, but that they can 
come to Ireland without work permits, are many not likely to do that? If one per cent of them 
do, it would be 750,000 people. If one-tenth of one per cent do, it would be 75,000.”36 
  
Coughlan was accused by MEP Proinsias De Rossa of using the kind of language which the 
xenophobic right is using everywhere in Europe: “there are votes in it, and in my opinion 
Anthony Coughlan has decided quite deliberately and reprehensibly to provoke a xenophobic 
reaction to Nice.”37 Coughlan maintained that he was justified in raising the issue, even 
though he himself favoured enlargement.38 The spokesman for the No to Nice campaign, 
Justin Barrett, accused the government of being “reckless and irresponsible” on this issue. 
Alleging there will be a “flood” of workers, Mr Barrett said, “If you are in the Czech Republic 
you might prefer to go to Germany. But if Germany won’t let you in, you’ll go to Ireland.”39 
The National Consultative Committee on Racism and Inter-culturalism (NCCRI) accused the 
No side of “alarmism”. The committee said the campaign’s use of emotive statements 
predicting a flood of workers coming to Ireland was “disturbing” and could cause 
“xenophobia and hostile attitudes” to immigrants to Ireland.40 Piaras MacEinri of the Irish 
Centre for Migration Studies asserted, “Mr Justin Barrett has finally laid bare the ugly face of 
his faction of the No to Nice campaign” and described this grouping as an “isolationist, 
xenophobic, backward-looking, far-right rump.”41 These exchanges on immigration again 
suggest that there is a great deal of uncertainty and unease in Ireland relating to Eastern 
enlargement of the Union. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
  
Although it has been argued by both pro- and anti-Europeans that enlargement was not an 
issue during the 2001 and 2002 Nice Treaty referendum campaigns in Ireland, the evidence 
suggests in fact that enlargement did matter, that it underpinned concerns regarding the future 
operation of many EU policy areas and of course arguments about institutional reform. It was 
suggested that Irish perspectives on enlargement revolve essentially around fear and 
insecurity and, as such, are part of a qualitative change in contemporary Irish attitudes to 
European integration. Although all sides express support for the principle of enlargement, 
there is an undercurrent of concern about the prospects facing Ireland as a small state within a 
much expanded EU. 
  
Does the Irish debate on the Nice Treaty help us to understand the broader perspectives on 
enlargement to be found throughout the EU? I argue that it does. Concern about the 
implications of the enlargement process manifests itself in similar (and of course different) 
ways in other member states of the EU. Whether with respect to economic issues, the future 
of the EU budget or wider questions of geopolitics in an enlarged Union, enlargement is a key 
issue in the political discourse within member states. Ireland is the only EU state required to 
hold a referendum on the Nice Treaty. Thus, it is only in Ireland that concern about 
enlargement has really manifested itself openly. All of the evidence suggests that, had other 
EU states been required to hold referenda in order to ratify Nice, they would have found it 
similarly difficult to have the Treaty accepted, and that, as in Ireland, fears relating to 
enlargement would have been central issues in the debate. Thus, for all the talk of reunifying 
Europe, righting historical wrongs and the moral dimension to enlargement, there is still a 
long way to go before the candidate states are genuinely embraced and welcomed into the 
European family. 
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